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machinery is downregulated in
differentiated neurons, whereas
the machinery for repairing
transcribed sequences is
maintained or upregulated.
Second, perturbations in DNA
repair more subtle than those
caused by genetic mutations may
contribute to the demise of
neurons in age-related disorders
such as Alzheimer’s disease [20].
It will be of particular importance
now to determine the influence of
both dramatic and subtle variation
in the different DNA-damage
responses, particularly the SSB
repair processing enzymes
(Figure 1), as well as environmental
factors, such as diet and lifestyle,
on the susceptibility of neurons
during aging.
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R58Decision Making: Don’t Risk
a Delay
Decisions under risk and choices between delayed outcomes are usually
treated as two separate problems. A new study suggests that these two
classes of decision making are more related than previously thought,
and that delay discounting may tune an animal’s attitude towards risky
choices.Tobias Kalenscher
Delay not; swift the flight of
fortune’s greatest favours
Seneca
What you risk reveals what
you value
Jeanette Winterson
Have you ever lost money
playing the lottery? And you stillhaven’t arranged your private
retirement provision? If you said
yes to the first question, you are in
good company, as approximately
40% of my German countrymen
occasionally try their luck with the
lottery, and even 11% do this on
a regular basis [1]. If you answered
the latter question with yes, too,
you are likewise not alone: in 2001,
only one third of all adult Germancitizens had a voluntarily provided
private retirement provision [2].
When playing lotto, you show
a certain risk-proneness, as you
prefer to invest money into
a gamble whose actual outcome is
uncertain, instead of using that
money to buy a commodity that
you could obtain with certainty. On
the other hand, when hesitating to
contract a retirement plan, you
prefer using your budget to afford
things that you fancy today,
instead of investing it to obtain
benefits that are yet to come.
These scenarios exemplify two
classes of decision making that are
extensively discussed in the choice
literature: decisions under risk, and
inter-temporal decisions. The first
class, decisions under risk, involve
choosing between an option with
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Figure 1. Summary of the new work by Hayden and Platt [13].
(A) In the task the monkeys chose between a safe option yielding a certain, medium-sized reward, and a risky option yielding a large
and a small reward with equal probability. The average payoff was identical in both options. (B) In many of the risky choices, the
monkeys did not receive the large reward immediately, but had to wait until one of the next trials. This panel illustrates a case where
the animals received the large reward after the second risky choice (for simplicity, only risky choices are displayed). The length of the
waiting period for the large reward depended on the duration of the intertrial-interval (ITI; duration indicated by the length of the
arrows in the figure). With short intertrial-intervals, monkeys did not have to wait a long time for the large reward, but with longer
intertrial-intervals, the total waiting time increased, and the monkeys, hence, discounted the large reward stronger. (See [13] for
more details.) (C) Although the monkeys were risk-seeking at short intertrial-intervals, the probability of choosing the risky option
decreased as the length of the intertrial-interval increased.a sure outcome (obtaining
a commodity with certainty) and
another option with a probabilistic
outcome (either winning the
lottery or not). The second class,
inter-temporal decisions, involve
choosing between outcomes that
will occur at different timepoints
in the future (for example to invest
in a pension for the far future or
buy things now). An extensive
body of evidence suggests that
animals are risk-sensitive when
choosing between certain and
uncertain options: they are
generally risk-averse, but
occasionally risk-seeking [3].
Furthermore, animals discount
(devalue) future rewards, and
hence prefer immediate over
delayed rewards [4–7].
Usually, most researchers treat
risky and inter-temporal decisions
as separate problems, and only few
attempts have been made to
theoretically or empirically link
them [3,8–12]. A frequent
assumption in these attempts is
that delays in inter-temporal
decisions affect choices in a similar
way as uncertainty does in decision
making under risk. In other words,
animals may equate temporal
distance with collection risk:
a temporally proximal reward may
be preferred over a temporally
distant reward in the same way as
a certain reward is preferred over
a less certain reward, since
delayed benefitsmay be lost during
waiting time, and are hence
realised with less confidence.In a thought-stimulating new
study, Hayden and Platt [13] turn
this logic around, and, instead of
assuming that delay is equivalent
to risk, argue that the risk attitude
of animals may be a function
of delay discounting. This idea
was triggered by the finding
that macaque monkeys were
risk-seeking when given the
choice between a sure option,
yielding a medium-sized reward
with certainty, and a risky option
offering either a small or a large
reward, with a 50% chance each
[13,14]. Their risk-proneness was
puzzling, because the expected
payoff of both options was
identical, and monkeys should,
therefore, be indifferent between
the alternatives, at least in theory.
Why do monkeys prefer the risky
choice even though it is not any
better than the certain option? To
address this question, Hayden and
Platt [13] reasoned that, if an animal
consistently sticks with the risky
option offering a 50% chance of
a large payoff, they will with
certainty receive a large reward
eventually: if not on the current
trial, then on a future trial. Hence,
the risky strategy gives a
practically guaranteed, though
potentially delayed large payoff,
and monkeys may consequently
construe the risky reward not as
risky, but as large and delayed
(compare [11]). If this were true,
then increasing the delay
between choices — prolonging
the time to the next rewardopportunity — should result in
stronger delay discounting,
because the monkeys would have
to tolerate longer waiting times for
the large reward. This, in turn,
should be reflected by a reduced
tendency to choose the risky
option (Figure 1B).
In the new work, Hayden and
Platt [13] tested this hypothesis. By
making saccades to one of two
locations on a computer screen,
monkeys could choose between
a medium-sized, guaranteed fluid
reward, and an even gamble
between large and small
rewards. The authors varied the
intertrial-interval — the time
between choices — and
hypothesized that the preference
for the risky option should
decrease as the length of the
intertrial-interval increased. This is
precisely what they found
(Figure 1C). Moreover, they
modeled their animals’ preference
pattern by assuming that delay
discounting accounted for the
monkeys’ risk sensitivity.
Consistent with overwhelming
evidence from the behavioural
literature on temporal discounting,
and in support of their hypothesis,
a hyperbolic model described
the monkeys’ delay-dependent
shift in risk attitude better than
a linear or an exponential
model. Just think about this:
risk-preference as a function
of patience and self-control? We
may have to revise some of our
stereotypes!
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Figure 2. Risk-sensitivity as a function of non-linear value representation.
(A) Risk proneness would be expected if the representation of the subjective reward
value were an accelerated function of the objective reward amount (on the x-axis:
RS, small reward; RM, medium reward; RL, large reward). Due to the acceleration of
the curve, the subjective value of the large reward (VL on the y-axis) would be dispro-
portionally higher than the value of the medium (VM) or small reward (VS). It is assumed
that the animal computes the overall expected utility (EU) of the safe and the risky
options as the weighted sum of all sampled reward values gained by choosing the
respective options. Due to the disproportionally high subjective value of the large
reward, the EU of the risky option, consisting of large and small rewards, EUrisky =
1⁄2 [VS + VL], would exceed the EU of the certain, medium-sized reward EUcertain =
VM. Animals should, hence, prefer the risky over the certain option [16,18–19]. (B) A
concave value function would predict risk-aversion due to the disproportionally lower
subjective value of the large reward [15–17].This finding not only strengthens
the postulation that risky and
inter-temporal decisions share
similar cognitive mechanisms, it
also opens up entirely new and
simple vistas on why animals are
risk-sensitive, and not risk neutral,
when the expected payoffs are
identical. One of the most
established accounts in economics
and foraging theory is outlined in
Figure 2. The theory goes that the
utility of a reward [15–17], or its
Darwinian fitness [18,19], is not
linearly proportional to its objective
amount, but increasingly
accelerated, so that the value of
a large reward is disproportionally
higher than that of a small reward
(Figure 2A). In such a scenario, the
average subjective value of all risky
outcomes would exceed the
average value of all medium-sized
certain outcomes, and animals
should prefer the risky over the
certain option.
Despite its wide acceptance, this
theory fails to explain the current
observation that variations in the
intertrial-interval affected risk
preference, as the length of the
intertrial-interval should have only
little, if any, effect on the
experienced reward value [20].
Hayden and Platt’s [13] suggestion
that risk-sensitivity is due to
interpreting the risky outcome as
a large, delayed reward, is
capable of explaining thecurrent data better than the
traditional approach, and thus
provides a new view on the old
problem — a serious challenge to
the established risk theories.
Like every other innovative idea
in science, this study raises
a handful of new questions. First, in
contrast to the monkey results,
pigeons’ risk preferences are not
affected by variations in trial length,
and hence intertrial-interval
duration [10]. Future research
needs to determine if this merely
reflects a difference between
species, or if the current results are
a peculiar, non-generalizable effect
of the specific task arrangement.
Second, alternative accounts need
to be ruled out. For example, the
monkeys’ mental representation of
the probability distributions of the
risky reward amounts may be
asymmetrical [3,18]. If the length of
the intertrial-interval has an impact
on the skewness of an asymmetric
representation, monkeys would
make intertrial-interval-dependent
and systematically distorted
predictions of what to expect from
the risky option. This, in turn,
should influence their risk
preference, and could thus explain
the current data, too. Third, the
precise cognitive process
underlying the computation and
representation of the discounted
value of the risky/delayed option is
unknown, and so is itsneurophysiology. The standard
approach is to assume that an
animal continuously samples the
current subjective value of a reward
every time it occurs, and calculates
the gamble’s overall utility as the
weighted sum of all reward values
[3,6,18,19]. In contrast, Hayden and
Platt’s [13] idea implies that
the monkeys look forward only
until the next large reward. This
suggests that the animals do not
sample the reward values
continuously, but combine the
sequence of small payoffs until
the large reward into a single value
representation. One thing is
certain: the next big question to
be tackled will be to address
whether this assumption holds,
and how this focus on large
rewards is implemented in the
brain. Do not risk missing out on
upcoming new and exciting
developments in this field.
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Merrier
This year, IL-17-producing T cells we
and soon thereafter, the cytokines re
delineated. Now, a transcription fact
been identified.
Casey T. Weaver1
and Kenneth M. Murphy2
CD4+ T cells have a talent for taking
on multiple personalities in the
face of different infections, each
one of which is suited for
coordinating the effector activities
that best combat the invading
pathogen. Early in infection, CD4+
T cells become activated and
release cytokines that help to
orchestrate the activities of other
immune cells, such as helping to
expand cytotoxic CD8+ T cells.
During more prolonged infections,
CD4+ T cells can become polarized
towards distinct subsets that
promote different types of effector
activity. The first such subsets
identified, the TH1 and TH2 cells [1],
have been recognized to arise in
response to conditions created by
the interplay between pathogens
and the innate immune system [2].
The tendency to oversimplify the
classification of T-cell subsets into
either TH1 or TH2 subsets [3] has
gradually been tempered, and
several different regulatory CD4+
T cell subsets are now recognized
that act to maintain tolerance and
limit immunopathology during
infection [4,5].
A detailed picture has emerged
to explain the development of
these subsets at the transcriptional
level. TH1 development is triggered
by pathogens that stimulate17. Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979).
Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291.
18. Kacelnik, A., and Bateson, M. (1997). Risk
sensitivity: crossroads for theories of
decision-making. Trends Cogn. Sci. 1,
304–309.
19. Bateson, M., and Kacelnik, A. (1998).
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Intervening Events on Reinforcemente More the
re recognized as a distinct lineage
sponsible for their induction were
or driving their development has
production of the cytokines IFN-g
and IL-12, which signal via the
factors signal transducer and
activator of transcription 1 (STAT1),
T-bet (also known as Tbx21) and
STAT4 [6]. TH2 cells emerge when
IL-4, through STAT6, induces
expression of the transcription
factor GATA-3 [7]. Regulatory
T cells can develop in response
to TGF-b signaling by inducing
the transcription factor FoxP3 [8]
(Figure 1).
Last year, a new CD4+ T-cell
lineage was proposed,
characterized by production of
members of the IL-17 cytokine
group, including IL-17A and F,
whose development involved
mechanisms that were
independent of the STAT pathways
required for TH1 and TH2 cells [9].
Relatively quickly, the
development of this lineage,
dubbed ‘TH17’, was shown to be
induced by the combined actions
of the cytokines TGF-b and IL-6
[10–12], naturally sparking interest
in the transcriptional basis of their
development. Dan Littman’s lab at
New York University School of
Medicine has now identified at
least one transcriptional
component of the TH17 pathway.
A recent report in Cell provides
compelling evidence that the
retinoic-acid-related orphan
receptor RORgt is necessary
and apparently sufficient forValue, M.L. Commons, J.E. Mazur,
J.A. Nevin, and H. Rachlin, eds. (Hillsdale,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates), pp. 283–308.
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differentiation [13].
RORgt is an isoform of the widely
expressed RORg gene. The RORgt
isoform is expressed during normal
thymocyte development at the
CD4+CD8+ double-positive stage,
and its expression is driven by an
alternative upstream promoter,
generating a transcript that differs
slightly from RORg by encoding
a unique amino-terminal sequence.
RORgt is also expressed by
lymphoid tissue inducer (LTi) cells
involved in the development of
peripheral lymphoid tissues, such
as cryptopatches and lymphoid
follicles in the lamina propria [14].
Littman’s laboratory had
already generated ‘GFP-knock in’
mice — in which GFP is targeted to
the first exon of the gene encoding
RORgt to act as a reporter of
RORgt expression — for studies
of T-cell development and
lymphoid organogenesis [15,16].
In examining intestinal cells from
these RORgt GFP-knock in mice,
this group identified lymphocytes
that expressed the RORgt GFP
reporter, but at levels that were
lower than those expressed by LTi
cells. When these reporter-positive
lamina propria lymphocyte (LPL)
cells were stimulated, a large
fraction of TCRab T cells were
found to express IL-17, whereas
the reporter-negative cells did not
express IL-17. By examining
differential gene expression in TH1
and TH17 cells using DNA
microarrays, the authors found that
RORgt mRNA was increased in
TH17 cells relative to TH1 cells,
suggesting a link between the
RORgt+ T cells in the intestinal
lamina propria and the TH17
lineage. In mice homozygous for
this GFP-reporter allele, which are
